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Abstract In this paper, we investigate the role of artifacts in a failed project that
aimed at implementing a new culture of dealing with errors in a hospital by transfer-
ring safety standards from the aviation industry. We apply the interpretative method
of objective hermeneutics to elucidate the role of artifacts as linking pins between
diverging interpretive schemata and collective action during attempts to modify or-
ganizational routines. In particular, we show how the implementation of artifacts
may serve as a means to satisfy a new espoused schema, while at the same time
they are created and interpreted in ways that strengthen the old enacted schema.
Although on the surface everyone would appreciate changes in treatment routines
that help to avoid errors, the guiding norms of individual vigilance and self-cen-
teredness, a culture that emphasizes hierarchy as a core value as well as the lack
of sanctions for enacting the old schema led to a situation where the new espoused
schema was never enacted. Instead, artifacts were used to stabilize a divergence
between espoused and enacted schemata. Failure remained a cultural taboo.
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1 Introduction
In recent decades the health care sector has been increasingly adopting procedures
and standards from the aviation industry with the aim of increasing patient safety
(Tamuz and Thomas 2006, 919). Implementing new safety standards in the health
care industry requires managing organizational change processes in health care or-
ganizations. Managing organizational change, however, is far from easy, especially
if it involves “second-order change” (Bartunek 1984), which focuses on altering
interpretive schemata that capture shared assumptions, values and social expecta-
tions (Balogun and Johnson 2005; Elsbach et al. 2005). Changing long-established
patterns of collective action often requires such a cognitive reorientation of the or-
ganization (Gioia et al. 1994) by espousing new or different interpretive schemata
(Isabella 1990; Labianca et al. 2000). Extant research that addresses the question
as to how interpretive schemata and collective action are interrelated (e. g. Feldman
2003; Howard-Grenville 2005; Tucker and Edmondson 2003) indicates that there is
a recursive relationship between both, meaning that they mutually influence each
other (Rerup and Feldman 2011, 602). Yet how espoused schemata are enacted and
which mechanisms contribute to this enactment has remained under-investigated.
In this paper, we draw on empirical data from a large change project in the health
care industry to extend current research on the interconnectedness of interpretive
schemata and collective action. In particular, we draw on the concept of organiza-
tional routines as “repetitive, recognizable patterns of interdependent actions, carried
out by multiple actors” (Feldman and Pentland 2003, 95) and interpretive schemata
as “ways of thinking” to investigate a change project that aimed at enhancing hospital
safety standards. The project focused on transferring best practices and procedures,
such as the implementation of an error-reporting system and checklists, as well as
human factor training, from the aviation industry to the health care context as part
of a large risk-management project. One of the core aims of the project was to
develop a new set of assumptions and values regarding how organization members
deal with errors and near-misses by implementing new artifacts that should facilitate
the modification of particular organizational routines, such as treatment routines or
surgery. Originally, our intention was to analyze how the use of artifacts makes this
transfer of good practices work. Our analysis, however, revealed that the change
project had failed to fulfill its original intention. We then went on to investigate the
reasons and mechanisms behind this failure.
In contrast to extant research that addresses the interrelationship of interpre-
tive schemata and organizational routines and mainly emphasizes how espoused
schemata become more and more enacted over time (e. g. Rerup and Feldman
2011), our results elucidate mechanisms that stabilize a divergence between es-
poused and enacted schemata. We propose that artifacts serve as linking pins that
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may be (ab)used to disconnect interpretive schemata and collective action. In our
particular case, the artifacts serve as a means to satisfy the new espoused schema,
while at the same time they are created and interpreted in ways that strengthen the
old enacted schema. We show that changing organizational routines by creating new
artifacts cannot be successful if these artifacts are – like sheep in wolf’s clothing –
used in a way that still satisfies prevalent social norms, which are deeply embedded
in the collective understanding of organization members and, thus, are further en-
acted in shared interpretive schemata. Although the new artifacts are purported to
facilitate change, they remain harmless and enable the further enactment of estab-
lished actions. Thus, contrary to our expectations, we found that how artifacts are
used may serve as a way to decouple schemata from actions. This decoupling keeps
the organization in a state of equilibrium that impedes learning.
2 Conceptual Background
This study focuses on the analysis of the recursive relationship between interpretive
schemata and organizational routines as patterns of collective action. Although their
close interaction is undisputed, interpretive schemata and organizational routines
have developed as two independent research streams. Just recently the interdepen-
dence of both concepts has been made subject of discussion and stimulated attempts
toward an integration of both concepts (e. g. Rerup and Feldman 2011). From
a social practice perspective (e. g. Feldman 2004; Howard-Grenville 2005), we
understand interpretive schemata as ways of thinking and organizational routines
as courses of collective action. Artifacts are “objectified summaries of routines”
(Feldman and Pentland 2003, 109), and therefore serve the purpose of connecting
interpretive schemata and collective action. This section further elaborates on the
applied concepts, demonstrates their overlap, and explores their interconnectedness.
Interpretive Schemata – Espousing Versus Enacting An interpretive schema can
be defined as “a set of shared assumptions, values, and frames of reference that
give meaning to everyday activities and guide how organization members think
and act” (Rerup and Feldman 2011, 578). As generalized cognitive frameworks
(Labianca et al. 2000, 236), interpretive schemata contain “fundamental (though
often implicit) assumptions about why events happen as they do and how people
are to act in different situations” (Bartunek 1984, 355). They incorporate social
expectations (Howard-Grenville 2005) and communicate values and norms (Gioia
et al. 1994). Thus, they provide meaning to organization members and justify
behavior in organizations.
Research shows that although changing established organizational interpretive
schemata is difficult (Nystrom and Starbuck 1984; Reger and Palmer 1996), they
can be changed (Bartunek, Lacey, and Wood 1992; Labianca et al. 2000). Such
change, however, requires the articulation of a new vision that contains new social
expectations and values. Rerup and Feldman (2011, 578) refer to such new or differ-
ent schemata as espoused interpretive schemata. Espoused interpretive schemata can
be compared to the notion of an “in progress frame of reference” (Isabella 1990, 17),
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insofar as they are designed to replace existing schemata and to enable managers as
well as organization members to develop new approaches in dealing with problems
and challenges (Rerup and Feldman 2011, 578; Labianca et al. 2000, 238). Because
“(p)eople in different groups (Donnellon et al. 1986, Meyerson and Martin 1987),
functional areas (Strasser and Bateman 1983), or hierarchical or status levels (Smith
1982) often see what is apparently the same event very differently” (Labianca et al.
2000, 237), espousing a new schema serves the purpose of aligning different ways
of thinking and creating a common mindset within an organization. In contrast
to espoused interpretive schemata, which contain an articulated vision, an enacted
schema captures the expectations and values that actually guide collective behavior.
It becomes observable as intention is transformed into a pattern of realized cogni-
tion and action (Rerup and Feldman 2011, 579). Organizational change is successful
when the espoused schema and the enacted schema converge and new values start
to determine individual and collective action (Balogun and Johnson 2005).
Organizational Routines and the Role of Artifacts The concept of organizational
routines has emerged as one of the most powerful concepts for explaining collec-
tive action in organizations (Seidl and Becker 2006). Understanding organizational
routines is thus a major prerequisite for understanding organizations (Becker 2004;
Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville 2011; Salvato and Rerup 2011). Organizational
routines are repetitive and recognizable collective phenomena that involve multiple
actors who are connected by interaction (Feldman and Pentland 2003; Rerup and
Feldman 2011). There are different opinions regarding the extent to which individ-
uals are assumed to be able to actively influence organizational routines. Becker
(2004, 648), for instance, distinguishes the view of routines as being “mindless”
from the view of routines as being mindful and effortful accomplishments. While
the view of routines as being mindless seems to be rather an implicit assumption
of early research, current research increasingly conceptualizes routines not only as
mindful, but even as multi-minded (e. g. Feldman and Pentland 2003; Rerup and
Feldman 2011). The idea of multi-mindedness involves the assumption that indi-
vidual actors, who act on the basis of their individual interpretations, influence the
collective understanding of a routine with their actions (Feldman and Pentland 2003;
Feldman 2004; Howard-Grenville 2005). As a consequence, changing mindsets and
interpretive schemata on the individual, group, and organizational levels may be the
first step in active attempts to change collective action.
Artifacts represent the visible symbols of organizational routines, e. g. formal
rules, standard-operating procedures, or codified knowledge, such as “how-to” man-
uals (D‘Adderio 2008, 2011; Feldman and Pentland 2003). They provide individual
actors with points of reference (Rafaeli and Vilnai-Yavetz 2004, 671). Accordingly,
attempts to influence the collective performance of organizational routines usually
involve designing and implementing new artifacts (Güttel et al. 2012; Leidner
1993). However, although artifacts “are often used to try to ensure the reproduction
of particular patterns of action” Pentland and Feldman (2008, 241), they rely on
the interpretation of individual actors to unfold their impact. Pentland and Feldman
(2008, 242) use the following example to illustrate this phenomenon: “Consider
the difference between a sign that says ‘Employees only – Do not enter’ and a
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locked door. (...) the sign relies much more on the interpretation than does the
locked door. Some of the artifacts that surround organizational routines are more
like locked doors in that they truly constrain action. But the vast majority, such as
rules, forms, diagrams and procedures, are more like the sign in that their mean-
ing is open to a variety of interpretations”. Although it is tempting to assume that
changing interpretive schemata and collective action patterns is solely a question
of pushing the right buttons by implementing new artifacts, designing new routines
or altering established ones is a complex and error-prone process, which requires
understanding of the organization members’ ways of thinking and collective courses
of action. How artifacts actually connect such “ways of thinking” and “collective
actions” is still a question that deserves more attention.
3 Methods
We applied a case study design (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007; Yin 2009) for
investigating the dynamics of interpretive schema change. Qualitative approaches
facilitate grasping the complexity of organizational learning processes. They are
even more advantageous when knowledge about organizational phenomena is un-
satisfactory. In such cases, qualitative research is helpful to provide rich descriptions
and build or refine theory (Eisenhardt 1989; Siggelkow 2007).
Research Setting Legal regulations in Austria require hospitals to regularly report
quality measurement and performance indicators to the government. Consequently,
hospitals are bound to perform quality management on the level of processes, struc-
tures and outcomes. Empirical findings indicate that transferring techniques and
procedures to minimize incidents, such as checklists, team training, etc., from the
aviation to the health care industry has positive effects on quality (Gawande 2011).
As a consequence, this transfer of safety standards from aviation to health care is
also gaining increasing attention in research (e. g. Tamuz and Thomas 2006; Lewis
et al. 2011).
Originally, we started our investigation with the aim of uncovering how the
introduction of artifacts facilitates this transfer of good practices in an Austrian
hospital. The hospital has over 350 beds. In 2010, more than 700 employees were
engaged in patient care. In order to increase the quality of patient care and to apply
for external quality certification, the hospital management initiated a “clinical risk
management” project in 2010. A consulting firm, which we have given the fictitious
name “Riscure”, was awarded the project because of its experience in improving
hospital safety standards.
The aim of the consulting project was to identify all types of errors in order to
develop measures for preventing them in the future. The project aimed at implement-
ing a safety culture and changing treatment routines by increasing standardization
through the implementation of new artifacts. The risk management project consisted
of various subprojects. In order to improve patient safety, Riscure consultants intro-
duced (1) an IT-based error reporting system, which we will call “FARES”. Another
measure was (2) the introduction of checklists for treating patients and for conduct-
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ing treatment and surgery. In addition (3) human factor training was implemented,
with the intention of raising awareness of the importance of cross-functional and
cross-hierarchical communication.
Data Collection To analyze the change project, we conducted 14 in-depth inter-
views with different representatives of the diverse hierarchical levels of the three
core sub-groups in the hospital (medical staff, nursing staff, and administrative staff)
and one interview with the CEO of the consulting firm Riscure who managed the
implementation process between 2010 and 2013. All interviews were conducted in
the mother tongue of interview partners and researchers.
The theoretical sampling of interview partners allowed us to interview all the
important actors involved during the consulting process. The medical director, the
head of nursing, and the quality manager are the key members of the “collective
leadership board”, which is the main body responsible for strategic decisions. On
the employee level, we interviewed people in different hierarchical positions, in-
cluding assistant medical directors, assistant doctors, nursing staff, and employees
responsible for patient transport from different departments. The interviews lasted
between 45 and 90 minutes. We recorded and transcribed all interviews verbatim for
further analysis. Additionally, documents and observations helped us to triangulate
our data. During the data analysis stage, we recognized the Janus-faced character of
artifacts in our case. We therefore started to particularly analyze those mechanisms
that foil change attempts.
Data Analysis If we had analyzed our data with a focus on the content level only,
we probably would have identified a “good practice example” of the implementation
of practices to enhance safety standards in hospitals. Actually this was the reason
why we chose the case. The CEO of the consultancy company as well as important
decision-makers in the hospital named this project as one of “their most successful
projects”, to put it in the words of the consultancy company head.
However, although the project initially seemed to indeed be a case of the suc-
cessful implementation of practices applied in aviation to enhance safety standards
in a hospital, one of the researchers quickly discovered some contradictions when
starting to analyze the interview data. In particular, there seemed to be a significant
gap between the manifest responses of our interview partners (“how they say they
perceive failure”) and the latent meaning behind what was said (“how they actually
perceive failure and deal with it”).
To analyze the reasons for these contradictions, this researcher decided to analyze
the data following the approach of objective hermeneutics (Oevermann et al. 1979),
which facilitates analyzing the deep structure of a text and the exposure of latent-
meaning structures. Objective hermeneutics does not focus on reconstructing indi-
vidual interpretations, but rather on uncovering “latent structures of meaning that
underlie social practices and subjective meanings” Lueger et al. (2005, 1147). Al-
though objective hermeneutics has a long tradition in German sociological research
(cf. Flick 2002; Hildebrand 2004; Hitzler 2005), and is best suited to “analyze real
social phenomena, to discover structures of meaning, and to reconstruct decisions
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and decision patterns by individuals, groups or organizations” (Wagner et al. 2010,
5), organization and management research drawing on this method is still scarce.
A notable example of the application of objective hermeneutics in organization
research can be found in the work of Lueger et al. (2005, 1148), who used objective
hermeneutics to analyze influence strategies and build on the assumption that “the
meaning of an act only unfolds in relation to the social context it is embedded in”.
Objective hermeneutics, hence, facilitates deeper analyses than traditional content
analysis. It is particularly useful to analyze how a system works and therefore
well suited to answer “why” and “how” questions in organization research. In our
analysis we followed the approach outlined by Lueger et al. (2005).
In our case, two teams of three researchers each analyzed different key paragraphs
that the one researcher who knew about the interviews and the project in more detail
at that stage had selected in a first step. Accordingly, each team analyzed key
paragraphs they did not have any further context about – one of the most important
preconditions for this kind of analysis. The teams began analyzing one single unit
of meaning, the smallest part of a sentence that makes sense on its own, after the
other without reference to subsequent text passages. Every unit of meaning was
analyzed with regard to (1) paraphrase (what else could the interview partner have
said), (2) manifest meaning (what is the manifest intention of what was said), (3)
latent meaning (what might be the latent meaning behind what was said), (4) social
relationship (what could what was said tell us about the social role distribution within
the organization), and (5) potential consequences for the next unit of meaning (after
what we know now, which information could the next unit of meaning possibly
contain). Table 1 provides an overview of these steps.
The interpretation of the latent meaning is of particular importance, because
according to the principles of objective hermeneutics, what is left out is often the key
to understanding the meaning of a text. For instance, reading the text multiple times
with emphasis on different words can lead to different interpretations. Likewise,
the use of conditional clauses, active or passive voice, leaving out the subject in a
sentence, switching between slang, everyday language and standard language, half-
sentences, repetitions, the use of specific terms (e. g. is something an incident, an
accident, a malfunction, a breakdown, a disaster, or a catastrophe), long breaks, etc.
are all relevant when analyzing the meaning behind what was said.
In a second step, we built topic-related blocks to “attend the dynamics of the
organization as the overall context” (see Lueger et al. (2005) for a detailed descrip-
tion of the methodology). This method enabled us to uncover the latent-meaning
structures underlying social practices and therefore gave us an indication about the
logics underlying change during the process. Whereas the first step aims at de-con-
textualizing, the second step concentrates on the structural conditions the statements
reproduce and the implications that can be drawn from them for the entire organi-
zation. Throughout the interpretation processes we have developed hypotheses that
have been challenged and constantly reflected step by step against the text (Flick
2002). Following Lueger et al. (2005) approved way of analysis was one quality
measure; the other one was to keep a detailed protocol of our steps of analysis (see
Table 2 for a selected example).
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Table 1 Interpretation scheme for fine analysis (Lueger et al. 2005, 1163)
Steps Typical questions to be asked
1. Paraphrase What is the information in the unit according to common sense?
Which issue has been chosen?
2. Intention of the inter-
viewee
Taking the viewpoint of the interviewee:
What could s/he want to say without explicitly speaking it out?
What meaning could it have for her/him?
What could s/he thereby want to point out to the interviewer?
What are her/his interests?
3. Extensive interpreta-
tion: Latent elements of
the unit analysed and ob-
jective consequences for
behavior (or the system)
Explication of general
structures
What are the different meanings that unfold if the unit is read with varying
intonation?
Linguistic characteristics:
Meanings of generalizations (like: one, everybody, people, etc.)
Are the verbs explicit enough (regarding who, whom, what)?
Specific grammar used: active/passive voice, conditional clauses, etc.
Other linguistic specificities: use of words, dialect, repetitions, breaking
off, slips of the tongue, etc.
Which people and issues are mentioned?
All other possible meanings of the unit
What could this statement mean in different social contexts?
What are the characteristics of a social system in which a statement like this
is meaningful?
Under which social conditions does a statement like this make sense?
4. Role distribution What actors (individuals, groups, organizations, etc.) are referred to (di-
rectly or indirectly) in the statement?
Which are their characteristics?
What is the relationship between them?
What are the consequences for the structure and dynamics of the system?
5. What are the conse-
quences for the subse-
quent unit of meaning?
What are the possibilities to carry on? How could the narrator proceed?
What statements could be expected?
Are there any restrictions?
Having identified a clear gap between how organization members say they per-
ceive failure (failure is good ...) and how they actually perceive failure and deal with
it (... as long as it does not happen), we continued our analysis on a broader level.
We conducted further interviews and analyzed them in the context of the project
and against the background of our initial hypotheses. Thus, in a second analytical
round, all interview data, collected documents and observation notes were analyzed
according to the rules of qualitative content analysis (Miles and Huberman 1994)
with the aim of reconstructing typical organizational patterns of collective action,
communication and decision-making. Additionally, the constant comparison with
theory (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007) served as a means to ensure validity and
reliability according to case study research standards (Yin 2009). Consistent with
standards of qualitative research approaches (Eisenhadt 1989), the research team
spent considerable time as a group sharing impressions and data in order to achieve
a consensual view of the results.
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Table 2 Selected example of unit of meaning analysis
It was insufficiently considered by us (Es wurde von uns zu wenig bedacht)
1 Paraphrase We thought about that too little
We did not reflect enough
We did not fully anticipate
We gave too little consideration
It wasn’t well-thought-out
2 Intention We failed to notice that
3 Latent elements Passive voice ... nobody can be made responsible
We failed to notice, but maybe others did notice
We focused on something else
We underestimated the consequences/the importance
It seemed to be so easy
We did not consider what it takes from our side to implement the project after
the consultants leave
The consultants thought for us; we were not meant to think in the project; now
we have to think and act autonomously and now we don’t know what to do
It is not reversible as we did not think about that at the beginning
4 Role distribution By us→ who? The collective leadership board? The hospital? we and the
consultants?
The speaker did not decide alone, but sees his responsibility
Others are responsible too
By whom was it sufficiently considered?
Who could have warned them?
5 Subsequent
meaning
What has not been considered
That it simply takes too much time, (dass da einfach zu viel Zeit draufgeht,)
1 Paraphrase Too much time is wasted
It takes too much effort
Nobody can return the time we have wasted
It swallows too much time
2 Intention Time is a critical resource and we do not want to waste it for that
3 Latent elements Regardless of positive effects, it takes too much time
We do not have the time that is needed
Potential benefits of the project are not valued
We can’t do it under these circumstances
It is useless to spend so much time on that
4 Role distribution What exactly takes too much time?
5 Subsequent
meaning
What is it that takes too much time?
4 Results
Our findings reveal how artifacts introduced as tools for schema change actually led
to a decoupling of interpretive schemata and collective action and hence ultimately
impeded change. In particular, we show how three subprojects aimed at improving
how errors are dealt with were put into practice: the launch of an IT-based error
reporting system, the employment of checklists, and the implementation of human
factor training. We describe how these artifacts led to visible change on the surface
and therefore legitimated that nothing changed; neither on the level of collective
action nor for the enacted schema. The design of these artifacts satisfied the espoused
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Table 2 Selected example of unit of meaning analysis (Continued)
To keep the project alive. (das Projekt am Leben zu erhalten.)
1 Paraphrase To carry the project forward
To pursue the plan
To continue with the project
To prevent the project from dying
2 Intention It needs effort; otherwise the project would not exist anymore
3 Latent elements The project is clinically dead
Similar to a patient at a critical care unit
Is it worth the effort?
The project cannot exist autonomously; we have to invest in it to keep it alive
We haven’t internalized the project aims; therefore it is hard work to put them
into practice
It is not part of our daily routine yet; therefore it is a lot of additional work




But we still want to do it
But we have to do it to become certified
therefore we decided not to continue it
schema, while in their implementation they simultaneously strengthened the old,
still enacted, schema. Hence, artifacts and their use allowed espoused and enacted
schemata to coexist and to drift apart, which stabilized the status quo.
4.1 Espousing a new Schema
Espousing a new interpretive schema by articulating goals and expectations is a
first step toward leading change. As noted earlier, espoused interpretive schemata
are meant to provide meaning for everyday action and to guide how organizational
members think and act. In our case, the espoused schema – primarily articulated
by Riscure and the hospital’s collective leadership board members – emphasized
the vital function of learning from failure. In an internal document Riscure states:
“Failure is good! Mistakes happen to all of us – all the time. We will help you to
systematically learn from failure to improve quality” (internal document, Riscure:
1). The medical director of the hospital, responsible for implementing the project,
emphasized what should be different after the project in the following way:
It (the new way of thinking – ann. the authors) aims at increasing awareness
of a risk culture, for every employee of the hospital. It will lead to a better
understanding of the necessity of constructive communication with real content
between hierarchical levels and professional groups. (...) It raises awareness
that making mistakes is a part of human nature. Everybody can make mistakes
and everybody makes mistakes. (...) Mistakes should not be about blaming
others and exposing them. That is not good. It’s better to say, ok, this was
a mistake and what can we do to prevent it from occurring again (medical
director: 302).
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Table 3 Espoused versus enacted schema with regard to failure
Espoused schema Enacted schema
How we (say we) perceive failure How we (actually) perceive failure
Failure is good ... as long as it doe not happen
Everybody is allowed to make mistakes ... but we will punish you for it
We have to learn from failure ... but we don’t care if you hide it
The head of nursing used similar terms to describe the new espoused schema. In
particular, she stated that:
We had the idea of establishing risk management in our hospital, which is
primarily about avoiding mistakes and not about looking for them and blaming
others. That was our first thought: creating a fundamentally new approach to
not denounce people in a certain way, but to try to recognize a mistake before
it happens and then simply correct or avoid it (head of nursing: 6).
Thus, decision makers of the consulting company, and the hospital clearly stated the
project’s goals and expectations. The new espoused schema was meant to convey a
radically new attitude towards reporting errors and dealing with failure. The aim was
to embrace failure as a source of learning by emphasizing that failure is good, that
people are allowed to make mistakes, and that they should learn from failure. With
regard to achieving that change, basic assumptions about communication across
hierarchies and teamwork across professional groups needed to be addressed. The
espoused schema also unveiled the shared core assumptions of the enacted schema,
which closely associated failure with blame. It also emphasized that there seemed to
be only limited content in the communication between hierarchical levels and fields
of expertise. Thus the enacted schema was mainly based on hierarchical thinking
and on isolated fields of expert status.
Although the implementation of new artifacts aimed at addressing these underly-
ing issues, our results revealed that even after implementation there was still a gap
between the espoused and the enacted schema regarding failure (see Table 3). On
the basis of these initial results we analyzed how the artifacts had been implemented
and thereby theorized about the interplay between artifacts, their use, interpretive
schemata, and collective action.
4.2 Artifacts and their use
Artifacts play an important role in connecting “ways of thinking” and “collective
action”. To implement schema change Riscure relies on standardized tools. Their
aim is to influence ways of thinking as well as collective action by introducing new
artifacts: An IT-based error reporting system should open errors to discussion with-
out blaming anybody in order to learn from failure. Creating and using checklists
mainly aim at affecting collective action directly by improving interface commu-
nication between different fields of expertise and sub-groups. The human factor
training is specifically designed to address the values and norms that guide the way
the organization deals with failure. However, our findings revealed that although
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all these artifacts aimed at satisfying the newly espoused schema and thereby were
intended to change the enacted schema they were created and used in a way that
strengthened the enacted schema instead.
Implementing an IT-Based Error Reporting System FARES is an IT tool
through which anybody can anonymously report errors or near-misses. Its purpose
is to serve as a platform where errors and near-misses can be revealed “without risk”
in order to use them as learning opportunities. Raising awareness of the importance
of reporting an error or particularly a near-miss after it has happened, however,
proved to be difficult. All our interview partners from hospital management overem-
phasized the fact that the error reporting system can be used anonymously. The
quality manager of the hospital described FARES as a system where “they (medical
staff and nursing staff – ann. the authors) can report any errors or near near-misses
anonymously. (...) Access is anonymous. It is absolutely untraceable who reported
what. You can add your name but you don’t have to. You can do it anonymously”
(106). Similarly, the head of nursing staff underlined, “it is vitally important that
you communicate beforehand that everything is anonymous” (152). Anonymity
should enhance the rate of reported errors, because nobody has to fear negative
consequences. Riscure evaluates the errors and near-misses and sends the statistics
to the hospital’s board twice a year (medical director: 4). Based on international
benchmarking data, Riscure provides recommendations for how to deal with the
errors (webpage Riscure).
Although the espoused schema emphasized the importance of learning through
failure, not even assuring absolute anonymity could persuade doctors and nursing
staff to use FARES, the reporting system. Instead, anonymity allowed them to not
use the system. One reason for the non-use is that reporting errors contradicts
the still prevalent basic assumptions of the enacted schema, which emphasized that
failure is a taboo and that near-misses are as much a taboo as actual errors. If
errors or near-misses happen the social norm seems to be covering up for each
other. An assistant medical director from the ophthalmological department (194)
stated: “Show me the nurse that reports that a doctor has made a mistake. It will not
happen, unless the doctor has some enemies”. Another reason for the non-use is that
the consequences of the report remain unclear; at least they are not communicated.
Responding to our question as to what happens with the results of the reports one
assistant medical director for surgery (291) replied: “Obviously there are already
numbers. But I don’t know them. There are parameters for measurement, but I don’t
know them. The risk assessors have them. I can’t give you any feedback, numbers,
or statistics”. As a consequence, despite the assurance of anonymity there is almost
no acceptance of the FARES system among the organization members. One nurse
reported “actually I don’t know anyone who uses it” (nurse gynecology: 156). Even
the medical director (152) admitted “the acceptance could be better. I think we
will have to reconsider if the system is good enough”. Ironically he continued that
he believes that “the employees would report more, if they were a hundred percent
sure that their anonymity is warranted and that what they report leads to critical
and fruitful discussions”. Thus, people’s fear of failure still remains and cannot be
overcome by communicating that anonymity is guaranteed.
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Implementing Checklists The aim of introducing detailed checklists is to stan-
dardize behavior throughout the process of a specific treatment routine (e. g. a
surgery) in order to avoid errors. Checklists serve as central tool in risk manage-
ment projects and are even recommended by the WHO in order to minimize the
risk of failure. Checklists define a “common wording” (Riscure webpage) and they
also serve as a bridge between different hierarchical levels and professional groups
with the aim of avoiding misunderstandings between these different areas of hier-
archy and expertise. The head of nursing stated as one of the central aims of the
implementation of checklists that everybody in the hospital should develop the same
ideas about how to handle specific problems. Although some interview partners
reported that the introduction of checklists has led to minor improvements, the head
of nursing staff admitted that there were some problems with the project that were
more massive than expected.
It was insufficiently considered by us, that it simply takes too much time to
keep the project alive. We had massive difficulties with the checklists that
were to become effective across the disciplines. The problem was to reduce
them to a common denominator within a short time (head of nursing: 237).
Some units even started to set up their own checklists right before the project
was implemented. “We knew in advance what would happen, and we didn’t want
to wait for the specialists to come and tell us what to do, so we created our own
checklists” (assistant medical director, anesthesia: 40). Additionally, in some areas
the impression prevailed that checklists were only for inexperienced “newbies”. As
one member of the nursing staff (47) put it: “Everything that’s on the list is clear
to us. Except maybe to new employees. But when you have been around for a longer
time, everything has become routine”. Hence, standardizing individual behavior and
communication across hierarchical and functional borders was difficult: “Too many
cooks spoil the broth. Take for example a checklist where the internist, the surgeon,
the anesthesiologist, the radiologist, and a couple of nursing staff are participating
and they need to come to an agreement about what goes on the checklist. That was
a really hard way for us and sometimes we failed” (head of nursing: 230). As a
consequence, multiple checklists for separate areas were set up. These multiple
checklists hampered the aim of achieving standardization and facilitated the parallel
existence of multiple views on what matters during the collective execution of a
routine. “We couldn’t implement particular checklists in the way we wanted, but
in a slimmed down version or in two different versions for two areas, when it was
absolutely impossible for those areas to reach an agreement” (head of nursing: 238).
Setting up multiple checklists for different areas of expertise actually prevents
communication and sustains hierarchical communication barriers. At the same time,
multiple checklists secure the autonomy and expertise of medical staff. Medical staff
and nursing staff still do not cooperate and use the same wording during treatment
routines but rather act in parallel. “It’s about communication. The hierarchy tells us
that it has to be the doctor who says what is to be done. The nurses look at him/her
and wait for orders. A nurse does not dare to ask multiple times, even when she didn’t
fully understand and then maybe she makes a mistake” (quality manager: 254). Con-
sequently, although the espoused schema emphasizes openness for communication
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across hierarchical and professional levels, the adaptation of checklists for different
professional groups contributes to sustaining established hierarchical thinking and
the protection of expertise.
Human Factor Training Human factor training aims at creating awareness that
making mistakes is human. Mistakes are not related to professional incompetence
but to communication deficits, poor teamwork or insufficient decision-making pro-
cesses. Therefore, one goal of training is to improve the collaboration between
medical staff, nursing staff, and administrative staff and to reduce barriers that are
created through the hierarchical structure at the hospital by creating a common un-
derstanding of terms in use: “It is important that the term ‘acute’ means the same
for everybody. Acute is acute and it does not just last one minute or twenty minutes,
but it has to mean the same thing to everybody” (head of nursing: 51).
All interview partners reported positive feelings vis-à-vis the human factor train-
ing. They perceived it as interesting and fun: “People said, ‘let’s be surprised.
It’s going to be fun.’ The human factor training has been regarded as a nice change
of pace, but it did not have actual implications” (nurse gynecology: 192). Human
factor training achieved the goal of raising the awareness of potential risks and
underlined double-checking whether a sample of blood really matches the person
at hand and the necessity of paying more attention to actions that are perceived
as routine and are therefore a source of errors due to carelessness. However, the
transfer to daily routines that involve different subgroups was hampered by the fact
that this issue was not covered by the training structure:
It was called human factor training and it was actually a lecture and not
training. To me training means that you learn something or ... that something
is taught practically, but that was actually a lecture by these two men that took
place under this name (nurse gynecology: 192).
Human factor training supported the change project on the surface but failed to
change the basic way of communicating due to the way the training was imple-
mented. The consultants aimed at transferring standards from the aviation industry
to the hospital, which – aside from similarities such as a “culture of expertise” – is
simply a very different context. While in aviation checklists are applied to standard-
ized processes of flying an aircraft, surgical procedures on humans in hospitals are
not as easy to standardize. Some interview partners emphasized what they perceived
as the limits of standardization in a health care context. “Standardization can also
be overdone. Every medical emergency is different. Always. There is a danger of
going too far in trying to spell out every single step” (assistant doctor, gynecology:
97).
4.3 Enacting the old Schema
Our findings indicate that all three artifacts and the way they were introduced missed
the target of changing the organization members’ attitudes towards failure. Failure
remains an organizational taboo. The social norms of dealing with failure are still
that errors must not happen at all and if they happen they have to be covered up.
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We found different reactions vis-à-vis artifacts that strive to influence interpre-
tive schemata and collective action. The use of FARES attempts to influence the
interpretive schema in terms of viewing errors as good, and collective action by
reporting them. However, since there is still a fear of failure in any form, errors
are not reported. Anonymity is important to remove the fear of failure; however,
emphasizing anonymity also implies that talking about failure is still not allowed.
At the same time anonymity allows for not using the system – users do not even
know if someone has used it as reports about or the consequences of registered
errors are not communicated. Thus, the way of implementing such an artifact that
aims at addressing interpretive schema change ultimately leads to a stabilization of
the old enacted schema, whilst satisfying the espoused schema.
Implementing checklists has a direct impact on how the treatment routine is per-
formed and therefore provoked various activities that led staff members to embrace
checklists on a superficial level. In fact, the checklists actually hamper communi-
cation and sustain hierarchical communication barriers and therefore facilitate the
perpetuation of the established enacted schema.
The aim of the human factor training, finally, was to address the interpretive
schema with regard to how to perceive and deal with errors. The way human factor
training was conducted met the goal of raising awareness, but was not sufficient to
alter the basic ways of working together in the daily routine.
Overall, the change project built on the idea of transferring safety standards from
the aviation industry to the health care context by espousing a new schema that aims
at incorporating new values and expectations. Regarding the approach towards the
project the medical director stated that “the consultants were inspecting the company
and they talked with department heads and teams about possible problems. There
are risks that can become manifest, and damage may occur from the risk. Based on
that, expectations were formulated, so we said what we want to implement” (medical
director: 60–62). He added that regarding the implementation of the project “the
intellectual approach was not to do a top-down method” (medical director: 45).
The rationale behind this approach was that the new values of participation and a
better cross-hierarchical communication flow should already characterize the imple-
mentation of the change project and thereby reduce anxiety and stimulate openness
for change. However, the way change was actually introduced into the organiza-
tion reflected the overall hospital atmosphere that is founded on formal authority,
hierarchical thinking and expertise (see Table 4).
Although the medical director emphasized the espoused value of participation,
organization members stressed that management, including the consultants, simply
presented them with faits accomplis. One assistant doctor (75) claimed “because as
an assistant doctor I am the lowest social class in the hospital, I was not involved at
all.” An assistant medical director (ophthalmology: 5) illustrated how participation
was framed “We had an event, where everyone in the hospital was obliged to partic-
ipate, and where the firm Riscure was presented.” Stimulating open communication
was a central aim as well and an espoused expectation of the new project. “It’s
about communication. The hierarchy tells us that it has to be the doctor who says
what is to be done. The nurses look at him/her and wait for orders. A nurse does not
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Table 4 Espoused versus enacted schema with regard to how change is implemented
Espoused schema Enacted schema
Participation: We want everybody to participate ... but we already know what to do and we will tell
you via hierarchical order
Communication: We want to stimulate open com-
munication across hierarchical levels and fields of
expertise
... but it is ok if you take different measures for
different hierarchical levels and fields of expertise
Openness: We want to change ... but there are no sanctions if you act like you
have always done
dare to ask multiple times, even when she didn’t fully understand and then maybe she
makes a mistake” (quality manager: 254).
Yet the doctors continue to enact their old schemata “We are lone fighters. (...)
There are no mutual controls” (assistant medical director, anesthesia: 311). Hence,
although the new espoused schema emphasizes openness, the new artifacts are par-
ticularly open for interpretation. The way they are implemented and used inhibits
change. The gap between espoused and enacted schema is still present in the state-
ments that were made after the completion of the project:
As I said before, it (the project – ann. the authors) strengthened the aware-
ness of the need to concentrate on not mistaking patients, not confusing test
laboratory samples. It made us think about sources of error and where to be
extremely careful. However, once it had finished, the flaws of daily routine
returned (nurse gynecology: 218).
4.4 Artifacts and their Role in Decoupling Espoused and Enacted Schema
To sum up, the espoused schema officially expresses a new way of dealing with fail-
ure and formulates new social expectations. This newly espoused schema, however,
is almost diametrically opposed to the old, still enacted, schema. New artifacts,
such as an error reporting system, checklists, and training sessions, have been im-
plemented to formally support the espoused schema, but were designed in a way that
actually facilitates enacting the old schema. In particular, the newly generated arti-
facts enable actors to sustain their execution of organizational routines (see Fig. 1).
As a consequence, artifacts and their use decouple espoused and enacted schemata
instead of connecting them. The decoupling of espoused and enacted schemata leads
to a state of anti-learning and serves as a means to maintain the status quo whilst
pretending change.
5 Discussion
Avoiding errors or at least learning from failure in health care organizations is of
vital importance for patient safety. Establishing a culture that facilitates learning,
however, requires health care organization members to adopt new ways of thinking
and to change collective action. The idea that organizational interpretive schemata
and collective action of organization members are tightly interrelated is increasingly
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Enacted schema
x x










Everybody is allowed to make mistakes
We have to learn from failure 
... as long as it does not happen
... but we will punish you for it
... but we don‘t care if you hide it 
Fig. 1 Artifacts as linking pins between interpretive schemata and collective action
attracting the attention of researchers. While Rerup and Feldman (2011) show
how espoused and enacted schemata converge through trial-and-error processes,
this study proposes that the creation of artifacts may serve as a means to interrupt
this interrelatedness. Although on the surface everyone would appreciate changes in
treatment routines that help to avoid errors, the guiding norms of individual vigilance
and self-centeredness and a culture that emphasizes hierarchy as a core value, as
well as the lack of sanctions for enacting the old schema, led to a situation, where
the new espoused schema was never enacted. Our empirical study thus highlights
the role of artifacts and how their use can decouple espoused and enacted schema.
Interpretive Schemata and Organizational Change Our findings elucidate bar-
riers behind interpretive schema change. Current research is well aware of the
difficulties of changing interpretive schemata (e. g. Reger and Palmer 1996; Weber
and Crocker 1983). However, focusing on how divergence between espoused and
enacted schemata is created and sustained can serve as a new approach for explaining
failure in attempts to adapt interpretive schemata. Previous work emphasizes that
changing interpretive schemata can work in different ways (see e. g. Labianca et al.
2000, 251). The “synthesis approach” assumes that schema change is the result of
a dialectic process, in which a conflict between two groups (one that champions the
old schema and one that champions the new one) is resolved by developing a new
schema that is a synthesis of both (Bartunek 1984). The “replacement approach”,
in contrast, assumes that a schema change is a more radical process, in which a new
schema replaces an old one (Labianca et al. 2000). In both approaches, schema
change works because there is a recursive relationship between interpretive schemata
and collective action patterns.
We show that the introduction of new artifacts in a way that facilitates decoupling
the interpretive schema from collective action leads to interruption of this recursive
relationship, which causes change projects to fail. This is possible because the
artifacts are designed in a way to fit the organizational culture and to preserve
hierarchical barriers.
K
146 Schmalenbach Bus Rev (2016) 17:129–150
Identity, Culture, and Organizational Change Our findings also contribute to the
discourse on identity and change. Previous research found out that organizational
identity serves as a powerful barrier to change (Dutton and Dukerich 1991; Gioia
and Thomas 1996; Nag, Corley, and Gioia 2007; Reger, Gustafson, Demarie, and
Mullane 1994). We can add to this literature stream by emphasizing that this effect is
particularly strong whenever change affects not only the organizational identity, but
also and especially the professional identity and self-concept of the actors concerned.
Tucker and Edmondson (2003) showed that the health care industry has developed
the social norm of individual vigilance, which encourages independence but also
prevents medical as well as nursing staff from discussing errors or near-misses
openly. They (Tucker and Edmondson 2003, 61) particularly emphasize that, as a
result of the hierarchical structure, one core rule of thumb among nurses was “to ask
for help from people who were socially close rather than from those who were best
equipped to correct the problem”. We connect to this finding by showing that the
social norms of individual vigilance and hierarchical separation in communication
are shared across hierarchical layers and that they are so deeply embedded in the
self-concept of nursing staff and medical staff that these prevalent norms serve as
powerful barriers against change attempts.
Additionally, our findings connect to the concept of organizational routines’ em-
beddedness. Howard-Grenville (2005, 619) uses the notion of embeddedness, which
describes the degree to which a routine overlaps with the enactment of other orga-
nizational structures, to analyze the likelihood of change in a routine over time.
Our findings indicate that the embeddedness of routines in a cultural frame that em-
phasizes hierarchy as a core value promotes stickiness and prevents these routines
from changing. Individual orientations towards a routine, as partly manifested in
our case by medical and nursing staff, might differ slightly, and therefore induce at
least some amount of variation in the routine performance. Over time, however, in
hierarchical settings the more powerful agents will exploit or even create ambiguity
to enforce their interpretations and attempts to change collective actions will suffer
a backlash.
Artifacts, Sanctions, and Organizational Change We also contribute to work
on artifacts in performing collective organizational action (D’Adderio 2008, 2011;
Rafaeli and Vilnai-Yavetz 2004; Turner and Rindova 2012). In their examination
of “the folly of designing artifacts, while hoping for patterns of action”, Pentland
and Feldman (2008, 235) already highlighted that the assumption that designing
artifacts produces repetitive patterns of collective action represents “technological
determinism”, which contradicts the complexity of collective action patterns. We
extend this view by showing how creating artifacts may even serve to disconnect
interpretive schemata from collective action.
Hence, ambiguity in designing and implementing artifacts may support resis-
tance to change in a well-concealed manner. Such artifacts may then be designed
or interpreted to support existing social expectations and action patterns. Thus, our
findings contribute to research that focuses on the role artifacts play in implementing
change. In contrast to studies that focus on how artifacts enable responsiveness to
change (e. g. Turner and Rindova 2012), we emphasize their function as legitimacy-
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preserving symbols that can become decoupled from the collective action patterns
that constitute an organizational routine. This process of decoupling facilitates par-
allelism of competing individual orientations (Gilbert 2006). With their enactment,
powerful individuals provide their own guide of how artifacts are to be interpreted.
Finally, our findings indicate that artifacts which are meant to change collective
action need to be accompanied by sanctions to unfold their impact. Thus, our study
contributes explanations as to why leading change by implementing new formal
rules (e. g. the mandatory use of checklists during surgery) does not always produce
the desired effects. Although current conceptualizations of organizational routines
(cf. e. g. Feldman 2003), draw heavily on insights from structuration theory, where
sanctions play an important role, previous studies on the impact of artifacts on be-
havior have remained relatively silent in explaining rule-following and rule-deviating
behavior. Without mechanisms that protect formal rules against violation, introduc-
ing new formal rules may be insufficient to drive change, especially if the new rules
contradict existing norms and the self-concept of organization members (Geiger and
Schröder 2014).
6 Limitations, Practical Implications, and Outlook
Our study connects interpretive schemata, i. e. shared assumptions, artifacts and
collective action. We do so by combining the methodology of objective hermeneu-
tics with more established methods of qualitative data analysis. We are aware that,
despite having a long tradition in sociological research, objective hermeneutics is a
relatively new approach for theory building in organization science. However, we
think that this approach can be regarded as a further step towards method triangu-
lation in examining qualitative data. We see it as useful interpretative method for
complementing prevalent positivistic approaches (Petit and Huault 2008).
Objective hermeneutics is one option to satisfy the call to identify generalizable
patterns of behavior (cf. Lueger et al. 2005) on the one hand and to offer deep
insights into single case studies on the other. It facilitates making the deep structure
of a text subject to discussion, which is particularly useful when the research fo-
cus lies on concepts such as shared assumption, social expectations, organizational
values, or power relationships (Lueger et al. 2005). Such concepts are deeply em-
bedded in the organizational culture and often are not discussed openly; sometimes
interview partners are not even conscious of them. Approaches that could provide
better insights into such phenomena should be appreciated.
Additionally, one could argue that generalizations from single case study findings
are always somewhat problematic. We tried to overcome this potential limitation by
providing “thick descriptions”, by deducing some simple principles with universal
applicability in similar situations, and with extensive comparison of our findings
with literature. The latter tactic can be regarded as a mild form of cross case
analysis (Yin 2009) that further enhances the robustness of the findings.
Our findings have some implications for practice. Attempts to guide the change
of collective action by implementing new artifacts might in some cases be a folly
(Pentland and Feldman 2008); yet they are common practice (cf. Güttel et al. 2012;
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Friesl and Larty 2013). Most kinds of change projects – more or less successfully
– focus on this approach. Our findings provide a further lens for analyzing failed
change projects. When powerful actors, i. e. those who create artifacts, observe
their implementation, and sanction compliance with them, (ab)use their power for
decoupling schemata and action, change projects are doomed to fail. A coherent
policy when implementing new formal rules accompanied by clear sanctions and
the willingness to punish deviations can align employee behavior if cultural values
and norms do not undermine this endeavor.
However, if resistance, e. g. not reporting errors, originates from anxieties which
are deeply embedded in the organizational culture change efforts need to address
causes on the cultural level before changing artifacts on the surface of an organi-
zation. Changing the organizational culture before implementing new artifacts will
consequently serve as a pathway to changing behavior that avoids a decoupling of
interpretive schemata and collective action. This finding helps to explain difficulties
that firms have when trying to implement change, but it is also particularly applica-
ble to change projects in the public administration sector. The logic of decoupling
inhibits change in small projects as well as in large economically relevant projects,
such as the reform of the health care services or the education system.
7 Conclusion
Until now, interpretive schemata and organizational routines have been largely
treated as two separate research streams. Current research increasingly emphasizes
their tight interconnectedness (Rerup and Feldman 2011, 606; Howard-Grenville
2005; Tucker and Edmondson 2003). Our paper provides a further step towards
the integration of both research streams. While Rerup and Feldman (2011) show
how espoused and enacted schemata converge through trial-and-error processes, our
findings suggest that the creation of artifacts that officially are aimed at changing
interpretive schemata may serve as a means to interrupt this interrelatedness. We
have explained how artifacts are used to stabilize a divergence between espoused
and enacted schemata. By focusing on the process of decoupling schemata from
action we have addressed mechanisms that may cause change projects of all sizes
to fail and provided an analytical lens for investigating the logic of failure.
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